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1.   
Much confusion and disagreement around the notion of  time is due to the fact that we commonly fail to 
recognize that we call “time” a variety of  distinct notions, which are only partially related to one another.   
The time of  the researcher in quantum gravity (like myself), the time of  the cosmologist, the time of  scientist 
that studies black holes, the time of  the engineering designing a GPS system, the time of  biology, the time of  
the train-station master, the time of  the historian, the time of  the lover waiting for her love to arrive, the time 
of  the old man thinking about his life and the time of  the kid dreaming her future, are obviously somewhat 
related, but they are profoundly different.   
For a particle physicist or a black-hole researcher, for instance, it is obvious that the time elapsed between two 
events depends on the path taken, while for the train-station master this is inconceivable and for the biologist it 
may be conceivable, but it remains totally irrelevant.  The time in Newton equations does not distinguish past 
from future, the time of  biology needs to.  And so on.    
None of  these “times” is false.  None of  them is “illusory” or “not real”.  They are all, each of  them, 
appropriate concepts for organizing phenomena at some scale, in some domain.   But they are only valid on 
some scales, for different regimes, and in different contexts. Some connections between these times are 
obvious. For instance, the subtleties of  relativistic time become negligible, irrelevant, when relative velocities 
are small.  Other connections are more complicated, they have required centuries of  scientific investigations to 
be sorted out.  Some nodes of  the overall story are not fully clear yet.  
The common mistake, that I find repeated over and over again, is to take any one of  these notions of  time, 
good and appropriate in some domain, and mistakenly think that this particular one is universal, necessary, it 
is “what time really is”, or “what we mean by time”.    
In other words, the common mistake is not in the fact that we understand time is this or that manner: it is to 
think that this or that manner are universal features of  temporality.  To understand time, we have to 
break it apart. We have to study its various layers [Fraser, 1975]: these have different properties, which in 
turn are sourced in approximations, in particular conditions [Rovelli 2018a].  
I illustrate below a number of  distinct notions of  time and their differences; they are all relevant for describing 
the real world.  What is important in what follows is to realize that many “obvious” properties of  time are 
actually results of  different kinds of  approximations and idealizations.  
2.   
Let me start with a well-known example.  Take two events.  For instance, I clap my hands and call this event A. 
Then I clap my hands again and call this event B.   We can say that between the event A and the event B 
some time has lapsed, and this elapsed time is a quantity tAB that can be characterized as the reading of  a 
(good) clock.  This is a definition of  time that can make many physicists, sport arbiters, and engineers, happy. 
How universal is it?   
In our everyday experience, it largely suffices.  But any good relativist knows well that this does not work in 
general.  The reason is that, if  they are sufficiently precise, two identical clocks measure different values tAB if  
they move differently between the two events A and B.  Any clock that moves (fast enough) away from A and 
then comes back (fast enough) to B measures a shorter time than a stationary clock.  So the time lapse between 
A and B is in fact arbitrary short, if  the clock measuring it is moved fast enough.  This is a fact.  
We may try to correct the previous definition by stating that the “true” time lapse between the event A and the 
event B is the time measured by a stationary clock: a clock that remains in my hand and does not move. This, we 
may think, is the longest possible time span between A and B.    
But this would be wrong, again.   The clock that measures the longest time span between A (the first clap of  my 
hands) and B (the second clap of  my hands) is actually not the clock that remains near my hands.  It is a clock 
that I throw upward at the moment of  A and catch back when it falls down precisely at B.   (The reason is that 
this clock is in free fall during the flight, hence follows a geodesic, which can be shown to maximizes the proper 
time between the extremes of  the flight). We could define time in this way, but it follows that if  we do so we 
cannot synchronize clocks over a region.  If  I clap three times, the total time is not the sum of  the two 
intermediate times.   
There is no common clock time: each clock measures its own ‘proper’ time along its path, and the proper 
times do not match on arrival.  The time of  a relativist is definitely quite different from the universal common 
clock time of  our daily experience. 
This is just how Nature happens to work.   There is nothing wrong in the idea of  a common universal 
time, but this idea only works within an approximation where we disregard relativistic effects.  General 
relativistic time is not unique and not universal.  
3. 
The same is true with regard to cosmological time.  Cosmologists use the notion of  “cosmological time”, 
which is roughly defined as the time that a clock sitting inside a galaxy would have measured it had started at 
the Big Bang.   But this notion of  time is an approximation, because when two galaxies merge (as our Milky 
Way and Andromeda are headed to do in the future) they have in general different proper times from the Big 
Bang. Which of  the two has the “right” time?  The question is obviously meaningless.  Cosmological time is 
only defined under the (false) assumption of  exact homogeneity.  Beyond this approximation, cosmological 
time does not correspond to clock time.   
Even within the homogeneity idealization, the simultaneity surfaces defined by cosmological time are not 
simultaneity surfaces in the sense of  special relativity, as can be easily shown.  Cosmological time is a fully 
conventional arbitrary labeling of  spacetime events.  
Neither our common non-relativistic time, nor cosmological time, not full relativistic times are “true times”. 
They are related but distinct temporal notions, with different properties.   The unicity of  our common-sense 
notion of  time is the result of  an approximation, like the apparent flatness of  the surface of  the Earth.  
4. 
A good example of  the misunderstanding caused by the failure to appreciate that the notion of  time is 
complex and not monolithic is the erroneous argument that Einstein’s relativity implies a static four-
dimensional ‘block’ universe [Putnam 1967].   
The argument goes as follows. Given two events A and B, with B in the past of  A, the theory of  relativity 
states that it is possible to find a third event C that is “simultaneous” to A with respect to some observer but 
also “simultaneous” to B with respect to some other observer. Since two simultaneous events are said to be 
both “real now” in common language, it follows that all the events of  the universe are all “real now”.  Hence 
the universe is a four dimensional “block universe”, which is “without becoming”.   
The argument is wrong because it is based on the mistaken assumption that the only manner time can 
function is as in our naïve non-relativistic intuition, where simultaneity can be defined in a transitive and 
observer independent manner.  Einstein’s definition of  simultaneity is relational and is not transitive.  This 
misunderstanding leads to the false alternative between Presentism and Eternalism [Rovelli 2019]. 
Presentism is the picture of  reality based on the idea that there is a common objective “now” all over the 
universe.   This idea is based on the commonsense impression that what we see around us is the is the 
common and objective “now”.   The discoveries of  the physics of  the last century have conclusively shown 
that this view is undefendable as the idea that the Earth is the center of  the Universe.  The commonsense 
impression that what we see a shared “now” is based on the fact that our senses are imprecise and we do not 
resolve the light traveling time.  It is much like the fact that around us we see that the Earth is flat.  
Eternalism is the idea that there is no temporal becoming, and our sense of  temporal becoming is illusory. 
What the universe truly is, according to the Eternalist, is a static four-dimensional block, where future events 
are “real now” as present events are.  This too is an absurd position, because the four-dimensional spacetime 
of  relativistic theories is a manifold of  events, namely of  “happenings”, and there is nothing “static” about 
them. There is nothing in relativity that motivates us to say that a future event is “real now”, in any reasonable 
sense.  General relativity is about happenings, not about anything static.  
The source of  the confusion is the mistaken idea that either time is exactly as in our naïve intuition, or it does 
not exist, it is illusory. This leads to the mistaken idea that Presentism and Eternalism are the sole alternatives. 
They are not.   Relativity offers a third possibility, where things happen, but there is no global present.  A 
physicist working with relativity easily develops the proper intuition to deal with a local becoming that is not 
organized in a single global shift from a universal now to the next [Rovelli 2019]. It is a notion of  time that 
lacks the global character.  
5.  
Before Newton, in the long intellectual tradition that goes from Aristotle [Aristotle] to Descartes, as well as in 
common parlance, “time” was mostly understood as a counting of  events: day, night, day, night… It is Newton 
who introduced the idea that time passes “by itself ” irrespectively from the events happening. (In his famous 
defense of  the relational notions of  space, against Newtonian’s absolute space, Leibniz was largely articulating 
(also with new arguments) notions of  space and time that were traditional, not novel.)  A few centuries later, 
Newtonian time looks “natural” to us.  
Detaching the idea of  an autonomously flowing time from the actual events of  the world was instrumental for 
Newton to build the conceptual structure of  mechanics, and proved a very effective move.    
This implies that there are two distinct notions of  times that are often at play (Newton clearly distinguishes the 
two in the Principia [Newton]).  The first is the old notion of  time as the simple relative succession of  the events. 
The second is the Newtonian idea of  a metric (measurable) time flowing by itself.   
The difference is substantial. For instance, if  truly nothing happens, Newtonian time continues to pass; while it 
is meaningless to say that the counting of  happenings continues if  nothing happens.  
The traditional notion is relational: time is a relation between events. No events happening, no time.  While the 
novel notion of  time introduced by Newton refers to a (peculiar) entity, which exists by itself.   
Once again, neither of  the two is right or wrong: relational time and Newtonian time are just two 
notions playing a role in the organization of  the phenomena.    
Newtonian time definitely turned out to be far more effective than relational time in science for a few 
centuries.  But Einstein’s revolution changed the game in an unexpected manner, which in a sense lead to a 
compromise between the two previous notions of  time.  Newtonian time was first brought together with 
Newtonian space (another peculiar entity introduced by Newton) to form spacetime. Then, this spacetime itself  
was identified by Einstein as a physical field, the gravitational field.  As such, it is definitely an entity, but not a 
peculiar entity anymore. It is a rather mundane entity: a field like the other fields that modern physics uses to 
describe the world.   Notice that even the causal structure of  spacetime is just a property of  a field, the 
gravitational field.  
Thus, Newtonian time is reduced to an aspect of  a field, an ensemble of  events itself, after all.  The traditional 
relational notion of  time, on the other hand, remains useful, of  course.  We can still count events in a general 
relativistic context and call “time” their relations, which are well accounted for by the mathematics of  general 
relativity.  We can still count day, night, day, night… and call this time, also in a general relativistic Solar 
System.   
Again, we have a multiplicity of  notions of  time, and we understand their relations: how some emerge within 
approximations from others in special regimes.  
6. 
There is no consensus on a quantum theory of  gravity yet, and no direct empirical support for any of  the 
current tentative theories.   But there are tentative theories of  quantum gravity, that coherently and 
consistently merge quantum theory and general relativity.  Among the best is loop quantum gravity, with which I 
work [Rovelli 2004].    
Loop quantum gravity describes the quantum behavior of  the gravitational field, namely of  (relativistic) 
spacetime.  It describes for instance the possibility that between two events A and B even the time measured by 
the same clock could be in quantum superposition of  two different values.    
Recently, the possibility of  measuring this effect (predicted by all current quantum gravity tentative theories) in 
the laboratory is been considered by some laboratories [Bose 2017, Marletto 2017].   
In loop quantum gravity, the relational notion of  time, namely the possibility of  counting series of  events, 
remains in place, but the Newtonian time, like the proper times of  general relativity are replaced by quantum 
variables, which, like all quantum variables, can be discrete, have a probabilistic dynamics and be in 
superposition [Rovelli 2018b].    
Hence the basic equations of  quantum gravity are very likely not to include a time variable 
[De Witt 1967].   The basic equations of  loop quantum gravity, indeed, don’t have a time variable [Rovelli 
2004].  
This, however, is no big deal, because classical general relativity can be equally formulated without using a 
time variable, for instance in its Hamilton-Jacobi formulation.  There is nothing mysterious in the absence of  a 
time variable, in spite of  the discussion that his fact has generated and unfortunately still generates. The 
reason for the absence of  a time variable is simply that in general relativistic physics, as mentioned above, 
there is no preferred time variable, no preferred interval between A and B. Hence, it is rather obvious that the 
theory can be formulated without a preferred time variable.   The theory gives the relative evolution of  
physical variables with respect to one another. For instance, it gives the evolution of  local variables with respect 
to local clocks times, and the relative evolution of  clock times with respect to one another.    
Consider for instance the example described above, where I keep one clock in my hand, throw the second 
upward and catch it when it falls back.   It is a fact that the time between the launch and catch measured by 
the two clocks is different.  Which of  the two measures the true elapsed time? Is the theory describing how the 
flying clock evolves in the true time defined by the stationary clock, or vice-versa? The question is meaningless: 
the theory tells us how the clocks change one with respect to the other.  
The conceptual structure of  the theory is clear and well defined without any need to single out a preferred 
variable and call it the real time [Rovelli 2011]. 
Loop quantum gravity allows us to (tentatively) compute what happened around the Big Bang, in the interior 
of  black holes or in other situation where spacetime is not classical, in a comprehensible and predictive 
(although not yet empirical supported) way, without any need of  having a specific time variable, or a preferred 
notion of  time, besides the ancient relational idea that we can call time any counting of  events.  
7. 
A striking feature of  the entire structure of  elementary physics (classical mechanics, relativistic field theory, 
quantum mechanics [see DiBiagio 2020], quantum field theory, the Standard Model, general relativity…) is 
the fact that the basic equations to do not distinguish the past from the future (provided we also swap parity 
and charge, namely swap the names “left” with “right” and “positive” with “negative” charge) [Price 1997].    
This is in striking contrast with the manifest irreversibility of  most phenomena around us, that makes the past 
direction of  local time dramatically different from its future direction.   
All observable distinctions between past and future can be traced to a fact: the tendency to equilibrate towards 
the future, but not towards the past [Myrvold 2021].    
Contrary to what the study of  the statistical mechanics of  gases suggests, in the real-world equilibration is 
generally very slow (the universe is still very far from equilibrium). Many realistic thermalization times are 
huge (in fact, cosmological).  The Sun is hot, the Earth cool, after billions of  years of  slow equilibration.   
While equilibration towards the future is intuitively comprehensible, the lack of  equilibration towards the past 
is puzzling. This is usually denoted as the puzzle of  the past low entropy, or the statement of  the “past 
hypothesis”.  In the following paragraph I mention some current ideas on the possible ground of  this 
macroscopic asymmetry: here I discuss what it implies about time. 
The key to understand what this macroscopic asymmetry implies about time, it to realize that the difference 
between the past and the future pertains to the macroscopic description of  phenomena only.  There is no 
way of  even naming it, in terms of  microphysics alone.  While some macroscopic histories (breaking 
eggs) are more commonly observed than their time reversals (eggs recombining), every single micro history is 
equally peculiar and equally unlikely to be found in the universe both in its ahead and in its time reversed 
version.  (The reason is that no single microhistory is ever commonly observed.). It is only when we patch 
micro-histories in groups (when we coarse grain) that we begin to see irreversibility: in the past, the actual 
micro history of  the world belongs to a macro state with an intact egg; in the future it belongs to a much wider 
macro state of  broken eggs.  Irreversibility is a property of  the macro-variables, not the micro-
history.  
It is important to stress that the time orientation of  all irreversible phenomena is grounded in this basic arrow 
of  time.  Irreversible phenomena are all macroscopic and statistical in nature.  That is, they all exist thanks to 
a microphysics with many degrees of  freedom where energy dissipates. Among these are the fact that we have 
traces of  the past (and not corresponding traces of  the future) [Rovelli 2020a], agency [Rovelli 2020b] and 
time travel [Lewis 1993]. The fact that all arrows of  time depend on the entropic one is important and is often 
misunderstood.   
An important consequence of  this fact is that since phenomena like thinking, being conscious, and similar are 
all irreversible, they are necessarily macroscopic.  They cannot be elementary.   
The key point here is that time orientation is not a necessary property of  some “elementary” basic notion of  
time.  It is only a feature of  the approximate notion of  time we use in coarse grained “approximate” accounts 
of  the natural phenomena.  The orientation of  time is ubiquitous but is not fundamental.   
The time orientation of  our thinking, of  our living, of  biology, of  evolution, of  the notion of  causation that we 
employ, the abundance of  traces of  the past that has no equivalent in the future…  all these phenomena are 
grounded in the macroscopic approximation.  They are all (in a wide acceptation of  the term) of  entropic 
origin.  The time of  the microphysics has no orientation.  There is no contradiction between this fact and the 
fact that we have any reason to believe that everything we observe supervenes on the microphysics.    
This is strongly counterintuitive, but it is an inescapable consequence of  what we have learned so far about the 
natural world. The very specific “temporal” features of  the time variable has to be studied with statistic, 
thermodynamics [Rovelli 1993] and perhaps the lack of  full information implied by quantum theory [Connes 
& Rovelli 1994], not in any a priori intuition about time flow.  Our intuitions have developed for our macro 
world, no surprise they are misleading 
8.  
The existence of  the entropy gradient in the macroscopic account of  our universe remains puzzling. It can be 
taken as a contingent fact or as a law (“the past hypothesis”) [Albert 2000].  It might also be a perspectival 
phenomenon.  The possibility that the arrow of  time is perspectival [Rovelli 2016] is a speculative 
but intriguing possibility.   
It is based on the fact that any macroscopic account of  phenomena is determined a choice of  macroscopic 
variables.  This choice is not arbitrary: it is dictated by the available physical interactions with the system. 
Hence any macroscopic account is fundamentally relational: it is relative to a second physical system that 
interacts with the first via an interaction that involves only a (relatively) small number of  varaibles: these 
variables are the macroscopic variables.   
This observation opens up the intriguing possibility that the asymmetry of  the arrow of  time is not due to fact 
that the past microstate is by itself  non-generic. Rather, it is due to the coarse graining defining the macro-
physics. This is determined by the physical way we interact with the rest of  the universe. Hence it may be that 
what is special is not the micro-history of  the world, but our being part of  a subset of  the world that interacts 
with rest via relatively few macroscopic variables, which define the peculiar coarse graining with respect to which there is 
an entropy gradient.   
If  this is correct, the distinction between past and future could be a majestic phenomenon, but a perspectival 
one: like the apparent rotation of  the universe around us.  The rotation of  the sky we observe around us is a 
perspectival phenomenon, due to the fact that we live on a spinning planet.  It is real but perspectival 
phenomenon.  
To understand time, as to understand all the phenomena we witness, we have to take into account the 
perspective from which we witness them [Ismael 2007].  
9.  
Experiential time is a far more complex phenomenon that physical time.  I believe that a lot of  confusion 
about time is based on the fact that we have a a rich temporal experience and we erroneously pretend to 
project it all over elementary physics, where it does not belong [Husserl 1928].   In this, we are as primitive as 
the ancient Greeks when they tried to understand the dynamics of  the material world in terms of  the “basic 
forces” of  “love” and “hate”.  
Experiential time is generated by the way our brain works. A specific activity of  the brain is to store 
information about its past events. This is possible precisely because the brain is a macroscopic object 
functioning in an environment far away from equilibrium, with a constant income of  free energy (we live 
nearby an infernal furnace burning at 6000 degrees, the Sun).  Hence the functioning of  the brain does not 
make up a time arrow: it gets it from the macroscopic physics that defines it and the entropic time arrow of  
the environment.  
The brain stores information in the form of  memories and constantly retrieves and utilizes some of  these 
memories.  This has the effect that in a sense our experiential present is impregnated by aspects of  the past.   
Furthermore, recent neuroscience suggests that one of  the main activities of  the brain (if  not the main activity) 
is to constantly compute possible futures trying to anticipate them [Buonomanno 2017].  Hence we equally 
live with vivid awareness of  some future (possible) events.    
The result of  all this is that our experience includes a sort of  temporal window formed by the set of  events 
included in memories and anticipations. This is the window we actually call “time”.  (See the notion of  
Lichtung, in Heidegger 1950).  
We presumably have this basic structure in common at least with mammals. Our species, on the other hand, is 
probably characterized by an increased span of  this window, thanks to collective memory (and science) that 
give us access to larger chunks of  past than other mammals, and a greatly increased capacity of  future 
planning, compared to other mammals, that give us a wider, and perhaps richer (or poorer?) sense of  the 
future.   
In any case, we literally do not experience just the present, but also the past and the future.   This experience 
of  time depends on the fact that we have a brain.  The beautiful clock in my living room keeps time much 
better than me, but it has no comparable experience of  the past and the future in any remotely connected 
sense.  It does not remember yesterday and is not waiting for tomorrow.  Our experiential time is grounded in 
our complexity.  The sense of  the speed at which times flows, the nostalgia of  the past, the anticipation of  the 
future, all the rich phenomenology of  our experience of  time obviously are grounded in physics, but are not 
universal aspects of  physical temporality.   
Yet, it is hard to make abstraction from them. It is hard to renounce the intuition that the Big Bang, 14 billion 
year ago is “very far”, while what happened 3 seconds ago is “just now”, and to focus on the fact that the sense 
of  closeness or distance is an effect of  the specific capacity of  our memory.  The perceived speed at which 
time passes has obviously far more to do with the working time of  our neurons than to anything pertaining to 
mere physics.  
To understand time, we have to learn to separate our intuition about time, which is grounded in this rich 
experiential time, from the concepts of  time that turn out to be needed to describe the events of  nature.  I 
think that too often we fail on this. 
10. 
Here is a brief  table listing some notions of  time with their properties 
10. 
Experiential time is not only heavily infiltrating and (mis-)guiding our intuition, when we try to understand the 
temporal structure of  reality, but is also heavily emotionally charged.    
Two of  the most influential investigators of  the nature of  time, who are perhaps at the farthest extremes of  the 
cultural spectrum, are Hans Reichenbach [Reichenbach 1958] and Martin Heidegger [Heidegger 2010]. 
Quite surprisingly both of  them point out that much of  philosophy —and other human enterprises— can be 
read as efforts to escape the anxiety that time causes.  
I suspect that this anxiety is not just an emotional disturbance that fogs our efforts to get intellectual clarity 
about the notion of  time. It is actually the other way around: time for us is largely precisely this anxiety, the 
emotional underpinning that drives the constant process of  utilizing memories to build our future or protect us 
from it.   
Separating these entrenched intuitive aspects of  time-for-us form the temporal notions we use to organize and 
understand the physical world does not mean that we have to choose one of  the two times as the true one, as 
opposite intellectual traditions unfortunately do.  Indeed, I do not think that it makes much sense to say that 
experiential time is the authentic one, as some contemporary schools pretend, while natural time is constructed. 
Nor I think it makes much sense to say that physical time (which one?) is real, and what we experience is 
illusory, as other contemporary schools pretend.  
Time notion Some typical properties Ground
Experiential time Feels as having a flowing speed. Brain structure
Irreversible time Oriented. Past differs from future.
Disregard microscopic degrees  
of freedom
Newtonian time Unicity. Single now in the universe. Disregard relativistic phenomena
Special relativistic time Independent from actual events happening. Disregard relativistic gravity
Cosmological time Global. Disregard inhomogeneity
Proper time in general 
relativity Measured by local clocks. Disregard quantum phenomena
Independent evolution variable 
in quantum gravity Arbitrary.
Not needed to describe 
happenings
Relational time Always available. Arbitrary counting of happenings
To get clarity about the complex structure of  the natural world, of  which we are part, we have to distinguish 
the multiple layers that build up the complex phenomenology of  time.  We have to get some clarity about the 
multiplicity of  structures that we negligently and generically call “time”.  
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